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into the face of such violence, take it upon ourselves, and 
even, if called upon to do so, bear up and suffer in some way 
because of it? As staff, administrators, and teachers on 
college campuses related to the church, how might our tasks 
be affected, even altered, by a serious living out of the 
words. 
WHAT I HA VE LEARNED: MAYBE PLATO WAS RIGHT 
Richard Yivisaker 
A popular view of Plato holds that his world view has had 
a great and largely detrimental influence while being 
transparently false. I have not been immune to this oddly 
dismissive attitude. It is with no little surprise, in fact, that 
I have gradually come to see that Plato may have been 
right. About everything? No. About some important things, 
however, clearly yes. I want to fix on one point in 
particular, a point which reverberates in a special way for 
those who inhabit the academic world. But first a brief 
consideration of some other points where Plato had an 
insight that merits preserving. 
PRELIMINARY EXAMPLES 
(1) Communities Are Not Necessarily Better Off By
Becoming More Diverse.
We do not have to accept the vision of social differentiation 
and hierarchy idealized in the Republic to see the truth in 
Plato's view that a good society requires unity in diversity. 
Diversity may be necessary, but it is not sufficient. It 
contains the seeds of discord and disintegration along with 
the potential for enriched life, as homogeneity brings unity 
while threatening loss of vitality and decay .. Everything 
depeqds on the wedding of diversity to some unity of 
purpose. We may accept Charles Taylor's notion that a 
''presumption" of value is owed to any deeply rooted 
culture, but this presumption has to be tested in an 
encounter of cultures whose outcome is uncertain. 1 This 
requires a commitment to such encounter on the part of the 
community, and this commitment is. the unity of purpose 
which constitutes the community. If we were to turn our 
attention to the call for increased diversity at colleges of the 
church, creating the necessary unity in diversity would be 
a major task. It is not a matter of simple addition. 
(2) If Politics Is To Be More Than A Struggle For
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Power By Competing Interests, It Has To Be Assumed 
That There Is A Moral Basis For Politics Which 
Transcends Special Interests. 
Indeed, even the rightful pursuit of power on behalf of a 
. particular interest assumes this. In our commitment to 
democratic politics we may reject some or all of the extreme 
measures to which Plato is led by this assumption. But the 
challenge of constructing a democratic process consistent 
with it is great. This may not mean, as it did for Plato, that 
the challenge is unmeetable. But the reduction of democracy 
to a naked or thinly disguised struggle for power parades 
itself daily.2 Plato knew a difficult problem when he saw 
one. 
(3) The Much-Derided Dualism of Body And Soul
Contains A Measure Of Truth.
Even ifwe take the radical dualism in Phaedo at face value, 
there is more to be said for it than fashionable criticism 
allows. We want to say, of course, that the very idea of 
disembodied existence is both unappealing and barely 
conceivable (if conceivable at all). But this does not remove 
the problems of embodied life which rightly concerned 
Plato. 
Of particular interest is his worry about the impact of 
embodiment on our cognitive life. For embodied creatures 
awareness of the world is mediated by organs which register 
and transmit sensory data. This leads to diverse points of 
view, depending on species nature, on individual physiology 
and psychology, on space-time location, and on cultural 
factors carried by language. The hope ofliberating rational 
consciousness from such dependence may strike us as 
fanciful if not preposterous. As may the idea that we can 
aspire to a form of consciousness which is without any 
point of view and thus god.:like. But bridging differences in 
point of view is a cognitive (and moral) imperative for us. 
So also, then, is discovering a process which in some way 
makes this possible. Plato saw all of this with great clarity. 
The point here is related to the earlier ones about morality 
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and politics and unity in diversity, and it brings us to the 
)dea that I have come to see as Plato's deepest. 
TOWARD A COMMUNITY OF DISCOURSE 
Another surprise for me over the years has been discovering 
the strength of the penchant for doctrinaire pronouncement 
among academic people. Our fondness for mere opinion, in 
other words. Deconstructionists and Foucaultians will smile 
knowingly at my belated loss of innocence. But we needn't 
be deterred by their deflation of rational discourse as an 
illusion masking some will to power or fear of the free play 
of interpretation. Either they must defend their deflationary 
strategy incoherently (with an appeal to reasoned argument) 
or they offer us no reason to accept it. So we are free to 
reconsider Plato's commitment to the dynamics of reason. 
The distinction between knowledge and opinion is central to 
the Republic. It was Plato's way of repudiating the 
reduction of knowledge to power or to groundless 
interpretation. Without this distinction the search for solid 
moral judgment is meaningless and the good life therefore 
impossible. Surely Plato was right about this. If personal 
or collective opinion is the last word, the true and the good 
are defined simply by our assent and thus become 
dispensable notions, except as tools of persuasion which 
work only until they are unmasked. 
On the other hand, Plato's use of this distinction is 
problematic. Taking it as a given epistemically, he makes it 
call for a parallel and equally sharp distinction between the 
objects of knowledge and opinion: they cannot be distinct 
purchases on reality unless they are about different realities. 
Epistemology thus entails metaphysics. In this way the 
original distinction produces a fundamental divide between 
stable, mind-transcending models or exemplars (the Forms) 
and the space-time particulars which are their images. 
We are rightly suspicious of the claim that knowledge and 
opinion cannot be about the same objects, even if we agree 
that epistemically there is a qualitative difference between 
them. But Plato's mistake is not the blatant one it is often 
taken to be. Crucial marks of knowledge cannot be detached 
from metaphysical considerations. For example, legitimate 
claims to know must be supported by good reasons, by 
"reasoned discourse" or "a reasoned account of reality" 
which can "survive all refutations," as Socrates puts it in 
Republic VII. If we grant this, we cannot avoid the 
question: About what sort of reality is it possible to have 
"reasoned discourse"? Which puts us firmly on the path of 
metaphysics. So Plato's attempt to harvest metaphysical hay 
from the field of common-sense epistemology has something 
to be said for it. 
More important, however, is the way questions about the 
links between knowledge, reasoned discourse, and reality 
are embedded for Plato in questions about the good 
community. Epistemology and metaphysics are inseparable 
from ethics. Even if we are skeptical about his metaphysical 
enterprise and suspicious of the social and ontological 
hierarchies to which it leads, we do well to ponder his 
insistence on the link between reasoned discourse and 
community. For the larger society his vision of a 
community built on reasoned discourse may be utopian; for 
an academic community it should not be. It matters -
especially in such a community - how the views we hold are 
supported and defended. Being right is not enough: better 
to be wrong with good reason than right with bad ( or no) 
reasons. So I have slowly learned. This may seem obvious, 
too obvious to have to be learned. But in my experience 
tough-mindedness about the pedigree of your own beliefs, 
especially the ones you hold dear, is not easy to come by. 3 
TWO CASES 
Possible examples of the difficulty are legion. I choose two 
which are of particular interest to me. In each case the 
choice reflects my confidence both about an important truth 
and about the negligence of a particular defense of it. 
( 1) The Death Penalty Is Wrong And Should Be
Abolished.
I have little doubt about the truth of this, though the tide in 
our country is running the other way. However, I have even 
less doubt about bad defenses of this truth. I pick one such 
defense, though a variety is ready to hand; and I pick it 
because it is close to home. 
The E.L.C.A. is in the practice of issuing social statements 
on major public issues. These statements become the basis 
for continued discussion in the church and for public policy 
advocacy. A minimal requirement is that the positions they 
adopt be defended carefully and honestly, that no shortcuts 
be taken to make them appear self-evident. An egregious 
failure to meet this requirement is provided by the church's 
1991 statement on the death penalty.4 Anyone who has 
really thought about this issue knows that the strongest case 
for retaining the death penalty is based on the demand for 
just retribution. It presses such questions as these: What 
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penalty "fits" or is "deserved by" the uniquely heinous 
crime of first degree murder? What punishment adequately 
upholds the community's consensus about the depth of the 
wrong committed by a brutal taking of innocent life? This 
case for the death penalty needs to be taken seriously by 
any convincing case against it: Can the demand for just 
retribution be met without recourse to the death penalty? If 
so, how? Is that demand itself misguided? If so, why? 
There is more than one way of minimizing this challenge. A 
common one is to equate just retribution with vengeance. 
For the E.L.C.A.'s social statement, however, the challenge 
hardly exists. Though it repeatedly cites justice as a goal of 
the church's social action, the statement shows scant 
understanding of distinctions which are crucial to 
understanding this goal. In the brief section on "Doing 
Justice,"5 we find the following:
Violent crime is, ih part, a reminder of human failure to 
ensure justice for all members of society. People often 
respond to violent crime as though it were exclusively a 
matter of the criminal's individual failure. The death 
penalty exacts and symbolizes the ultimate personal 
retribution. 
Yet, capital punishment makes no provable impact on the 
breeding grounds of violent crime. Executions harm 
society by mirroring and reinforcing existing injustice. 
The death penalty distracts us from our work toward a just 
society . . .  It perpetuates cycles of violence. 
The statement then calls for "an assault on the root causes 
of violent crime" and asserts without argument that 
problems of fairness in the administration of the death 
penalty are insurmountable. Finally, we are told that 
The practice of the death penalty undermines any possible 
moral message we might want to 'send. ' It is not fair and 
fails to make society better or safer. The message 
conveyed by an execution . . .  is one of brutality and 
violence. 6 
In a few lines the demand for just retribution is first 
slighted, then confused with different concerns, and finally 
obliterated. It is hard to imagine less regard for reasoned 
discourse. The presupposition ofthe argument, if there is an 
argument, is that the primary agent of crime is society, the 
alleged criminal being more a victim than a perpetrator of 
injustice. This presupposition is not self-evident; it needs to 
be argued. And it needs to be argued case by case-unless we 
fall back on a social determinism which removes all 
responsibility and with it any role for the notions of justice 
and injustice. This, too, would need to be argued. 
(2) We Must Extend The Boundaries Of Moral Concern
Beyond Humanity To Encompass All Of The Natural
World.
I find this imperative as compelling as the one about the 
death penalty. It certainly is unproblematic within a 
theocentric ethic: "The earth is the Lord's and the fulness 
thereof." But how make it compelling to resistant non­
theists? 
Consider a recent attempt in this direction: Larry 
Rasmussen's Earth Community Earth Ethics.7 Though there
is much to admire in Rasmussen's book, it provides another 
example of the failure to offer compelling reasons for a 
strongly held position. We may agree with Rasmussen's 
judgment that a way of life tied to a consumption-driven, 
globally expanding market economy is unsustainable and 
that its threat to ecological well-being is growing 
exponentially, and agree as well that the urgency of the 
situation calls for a paradigm shift in our moral thinking. 
But how are we to ground the necessary shift? Showing its 
utility is one thing; grounding it is something else. 
Rasmussen attempts to ground it in two ways. One is by 
expanding the realm of sentient life, life capable of 
experiencing pain; the other, as his title suggests, is by 
enlarging our view of community. Each fails even 
moderately stringent tests of rationality. The unintended 
result is to tum Rasmussen's brief for a non-homocentric 
ethic on its head. 
There is no phrase more often repeated in his book than 
"earth's distress." The less dramatic variants include 
"creation's pain," "the cry of the earth," "nature's 
suffering." Sometimes God is the one who is said to suffer 
as a result of nature's degradation. More typically, however, 
"earth," "nature," or "creation" itself is viewed as the 
subject of suffering. This way of speaking serves to make 
all of creation the focus of moral regard and to awaken 
compassion for it. But what is the basis for adopting such 
language? Rasmussen offers only constant use of the 
language, intimating that refusal to adopt it is a sign of 
homocentric arrogance. Emphatic reassertion, in other 
words, rather than argument. It would indeed be arrogance 
to deny suffering to nature where observable behavior 
displays it. But where there is no such behavior, the 
attribution of suffering becomes moralizing sentimentality. 
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Rasmussen's other attempt to ground a radical revision of 
.. . our moral framework fails similarly: the natural world is 
characterized in a way which encourages the revision, but 
little rationale is offered for it beyond the characterization 
itself. This time the language is that of "cosmic 
community," "earth community," "the community of life," 
"creation as a genuine community," "nature as both the 
aboriginal and comprehensive community." Such phrases 
are used again and again as the basis for a "comprehensive 
communitarian ethic. "8 
The thinness of Rasmussen's argument is revealed as soon 
as we ask how "community" is to be understood. The 
difficulty he faces is that this concept must have moral 
import and yet be comprehensively applicable. The latter 
requirement is satisfied by explicating "community" in 
broad relational terms. We hear about the "internal 
relatedness and interdependence of creation," the 
"interconnectedness . . . among all things," and the 
"intricate togetherness of things." Talking this way is 
convincing as long as we understand it in causal terms. It 
is no accident that Rasmussen appeals to the discoveries of 
natural science to ground his communitarian view of nature. 
But causal interdependence, simply as such, lacks moral 
import. Rasmussen unwittingly exposes the . crucial non­
sequitur: 'The goodness of life together and the reciprocity 
learned in genuine community create moral agency and 
responsibility. "9 A community in which reciprocity is
learned is indeed a moral community; but the 
interdependence which holds it together is more than causal, 
a kind of interdependence we have been given no reason to 
apply to the cosmos. 
Aldo Leopold fell into the same error m his classic 
expression of this communitarian vision. 
All ethics so far evolved rest upon a single premise: that 
the individual is a member of a community of 
interdependent parts. His instincts prompt him to compete 
for his place in that community, but his ethics prompt him 
also to co-operate . . .  The land ethic simply enlarges the 
boundary of the community to include soils, waters, plants, 
and animals, or collectively: the land. 10 
Ethics requires the context of community and community 
requires an interdependence of cooperating members. But 
the land (in Leopold's sense) is not such a community. The 
mutuality essential to cooperation and hence to moral 
community is absent. 
Rasmussen and Leopold take a concept whose moral 
pregnancy derives from a human context and extend it 
beyond that context without supporting evidence. 
Equivocating on the word "community," they end up 
attacking a homocentric bias in ethics with a conceptual 
move which is itself deeply homocentric. Ironically, 
reconceiving the natural world in our image has become the 
basis for reconceiving ourselves in nature's image.11 The 
result is an expanded moral vision supported by no good 
reason. Little more than mere opinion, Plato would have 
said. And he would have been right. 
THE DIFFERENCE IT MAKES 
Why should we care about having good reasons for our 
beliefs? 12 Well, the likelihood of having true beliefs is 
enhanced by good reasons. That is, good reasons make it 
more likely that my beliefs reflect the way things really are 
and not merely the way I want them to be. Suppose, 
however, that we reject the very idea of "the way things 
really are"; or we say that what matters about a view of the 
cosmos is not whether it is objectively true but whether it 
supports a preferred moral vision, or that moral visions do 
not need grounding in the way things really are. 
Plato, of course, would demur on all of these suppositions. 
But assume that there is something to be said for them. 
Even then Plato would continue to defend the demand for 
good reasons since reason � linked to the possibility of g 
community of discourse. Disdain good reasons and you risk 
losing this possibility. 13 Reason fosters such a community 
because it is by nature dialectical. Provoking us to discover 
incoherence in our beliefs, it leads us to uncover the 
assumptions on which they rest and to subject these 
assumptions to critical scrutiny. In this way it pulls us 
toward the vision of a ground which can compel the assent 
of all who reach it and thus bind us together. But this 
movement has to be governed by the mutuality it seeks; 
hidden contradictions and underlying assumptions do not 
yield readily to a solitary mind. The dialectic of reason is 
of necessity dialogical. 
Here, then, is the fundamental insight: Offering reasons to 
support our beliefs and caring about the best possible 
reasons is a way of exposing ourselves to others and 
reaching out to them in the name of a community of 
discourse, a way of inviting them to join us in building this 
community. Refusing to provide reasons or to care about 
them is a rejection of community, an attempt to get others 




Each of the ideas for which I earlier claimed Platonic 
ancestry points to this final one. For me its essential 
rightness has taken a long time to sink in. Teaching for 
many years is what made it possible. Largely by 
happenstance, I stumbled into a way of teaching which 
involved taking positions in class - real positions, positions 
to which I was seriously if provisionally committed - and 
urging students to come at them with their probing 
criticism. My initial motivation was to get them thinking by 
making myself vulnerable in this way. But what I 
discovered was a dialectic in which, on the good days, we 
pushed each other into thinking in new ways and doing this 
together for the sake of deeper understanding. I 
rediscovered Plato. 
How can there be academic community without something 
like this as the controlling ethos, in the conversations not 
only of faculty with students but among students themselves 
and even - the biggest challenge - within the faculty? How 
( even more) can it fail to be the controlling ethos at a 
college of the church, with its confession of faith in the 
creative Word and trust in a Holy Spirit moving among us? 
Here, at least, Athens and Jerusalem should meet. 
NOTES 
1 Charles Taylor et. al., Multiculturalism: Examining the 
Politics of Recognition (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University 
Press, 1994) 63-73. 
2 Jesse Helms' use of the power of his chairmanship of the 
Senate Foreign Relations Committee to prevent both 
committee and floor debate on William Weld's nomination 
to be Ambassador to Mexico is a recent example of a naked 
exercise of power at the expense of the democratic process. 
The fate of the McCain-Feingold bill on campaign finance 
reform is another, though in that case the power struggle 
was at least thinly disguised. 
3 A likely rejoinder here would say, "Surely there are views 
which can only be held with little or no reason." Perhaps. 
But we ought to be suspicious of any particular claim to 
this effect if it is made with no investigation of possible 
reasons. That there are no possible reasons is itself a claim 
which needs argument and thus reasons. 
4 Evangelical Lutheran Church in America, "A Social 
Statement on: The Death Penalty" (September 1991). 
5 Ibid, 3. 
6 Ibid, 4. Emphasis added. 
7 Larry L. Rasmussen, Earth Community Earth Ethics 
(Maryknoll, NY: Orbis Books, 1996). 
8 This theme appears throughout the book, but it is 
especially prominent in the concluding part, "Earth Action," 
319 ff 
9 Ibid, 3 13. Emphasis added. 
10 Aldo Leopold, A Sand County Almanac (New York, NY: 
Oxford University Press, 1949), 203-204. 
11 It may be that homocentrism is inescapable here, that we 
need to find a way through it to a recognition of worth in 
the natural world which is independent of our interests. 
Rasmussen occasionally suggests a possibility of this sort 
without pursuing it: recognition of the ways in which we are 
implicated in nature's web of causal interdependence has the 
power to awaken gratitude for the gifts we receive from it. 
Gratitude, of course, is homocentric: it is gratitude for a 
benefit to us. But gratitude seems also to acknowledge the 
intrinsic worth of the source of the benefit: we can hardly be 
grateful if we view the source as having merely instrumental 
value relative to our interests. Whether gratitude must 
always be felt toward a person is a further question. An 
intriguing one which bears on the possibility of having an 
environmental ethic which can be non-theocentric as well as 
theocentric. 
12 Perhaps there are beliefs which are matters of "faith" and 
not of reason (i.e. -of any conceivable kind of reason). But 
beliefs designed to provide a non-theocentric foundation for 
expanding the boundaries of moral regard are not promising 
candidates. 
13 Whether Plato would say further, following Rousseau in 
The Social Contract, that without a community of discourse 
no reason is possible, is unclear to me. 
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